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I. INTRODUCTION

T
I

he seemingly tangential nature of international law to the debate regarding strikes on Syria is both remarkable and disheartening.1 With war clouds
looming, the Administration has yet to fully present its legal justification
for military action. Instead, President Obama has merely signaled his willingness to go “forward without the approval of a United Nations Security
Council that, so far, has been completely paralyzed and unwilling to hold
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1. The U.S. operations would be in response to alleged, repeated use by the Assad regime of chemical weapons. On the chemical attacks, see Chairman, United Kingdom Joint
Intelligence Committee, Syria: Reporting Chemical Weapons Use, Aug. 29, 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/23509
4/Jp_115_JD_PM_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf. The most
significant event occurred on August, 21, 2013. U.S. estimates are that over 1000 people
died in that attack, whereas the British estimate is approximately 350. Contrast The White
House, Statement by the President on Syria, Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov
/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria, with Joint Intelligence Organisation, Assessment on Reported Chemical Weapons Use in Damascus, Aug. 27, 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/23509
4/Jp_115_JD_PM_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf.
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Assad accountable.” He explains that the most recent and severe chemical
weapons attack on 21 August 2013
. . . is an assault on human dignity. It also presents a serious danger to our
national security. It risks making a mockery of the global prohibition on
the use of chemical weapons. It endangers our friends and our partners
along Syria’s borders, including Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq.
It could lead to escalating use of chemical weapons, or their proliferation
to terrorist groups who would do our people harm.2

Use of armed force by one State against another has two legal consequences. First, military operations at the level currently contemplated with
respect to Syria initiate an “international armed conflict” in which the jus in
bello (international humanitarian law) governs how the ensuing hostilities
may be conducted.3 The objectives of the attacking State are irrelevant to
the existence of an armed conflict, which is an entirely fact-based legal status. Similarly, although disagreement exists over whether low levels of violence qualify as armed conflict,4 there is no question that operations involving cruise missiles or other aerial strikes reach this threshold.5 In lay terms,
the launch of military operations by the United States and its partners
against Syria would mean those countries were “at war” as a matter of international law.
Second, the resort to military force by a State constitutes a “use of
force” under the jus ad bellum. The jus ad bellum addresses the issue of when
2. Statement by the President, supra note 1.
3. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct.
2, 1995).
4. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 57 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed.
2008).
5. “Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of
armed forces is an armed conflict [qualifies as an armed conflict] . . . . It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts or how much slaughter takes place.” COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED
AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952); COMMENTARY:
GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AT SEA 28 (Jean Pictet
ed., 1960); COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR OF AUGUST 12, 1949 23 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960); COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF
WAR 20 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958).
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States may use force as an instrument of their national policies. Its most
fundamental norm is the prohibition found in customary law and set forth
in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”6 Absent an applicable
exception to this proscription, U.S. military operations against Syria will
arguably violate international law.
This inaugural contribution to the “Current Developments” section of
International Law Studies explores the possible legal justifications for using
armed force against Syria. The analysis draws solely on international law;
no effort is made to examine Presidential authority to order strikes under
U.S. law. The article concludes that there is no unassailable legal basis for
the operations. Therefore, it is imperative that the Administration provide
its legal justification in order to inform the ongoing debate and before ordering U.S. forces into harm’s way.
II. POSSIBLE LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS
A. Security Council Authorization
The U.N. Charter contains two express exceptions to the prohibition on
the use of force.7 Security Council authorization pursuant to Articles 39
and 42 is the first. By those articles, the Council is authorized to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression” and decide upon measures, including the use of force, necessary “to maintain or restore international peace and security.” There is no
question that a Security Council Resolution authorizing “all necessary
means” (U.N. shorthand for “force”) to respond to Syria’s use of chemical
weapons, or to more broadly address the humanitarian disaster in the country, would be lawful. Indeed, the Security Council has authorized forceful

6. U.N. Charter art. 2(4). On its customary law nature, see Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 188–90 (June 27)
[hereinafter Nicaragua].
7. The U.N. Secretary General has asserted that these are the only bases for the use of
force. See U.N. Secretary General, Press Encounter on Syria, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www
.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=2967.
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humanitarian interventions on a number of occasions, most recently during
the Libyan conflict.8
However, every indication is that Russia and/or China would exercise
their veto power as Permanent members of the Council to block an all
necessary means resolution. Although it is sometimes suggested that the
General Assembly may act when the Security Council is deadlocked and
therefore unable to respond to a serious threat to, or breach of, international peace and security,9 the existence of such a mechanism is legally
questionable. More to the point, in the case at hand the United States
would be unlikely to muster the necessary votes in the General Assembly.
B. Self-Defense
In the absence of Security Council authorization, the sole remaining textual
basis for using force set forth in the Charter is self-defense pursuant to Article 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” This treaty right reflects customary law.10 States subjected to an armed attack may
respond individually or seek the assistance of other States in collective selfdefense. In the latter case, a State may provide assistance only once the victim State has requested it.11
Syria has not attacked the United States or any other State, nor is there
any evidence that it intends to do so in the near future. On the contrary,
such an action would be irrational given its internal turmoil. Thus, there is
no basis for immediate or anticipatory self or collective defense against a
paradigmatic armed attack. It is true that that the situation in Syria is destabilizing the region, particularly with respect to refugee flows into Turkey
and other neighboring countries. However, contagious instability does not
rise to the level of an armed attack such that the affected States may employ force in self-defense (or seek the help of other States in collective de-

8. S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). See also, S.C. Res. 794 (Dec. 3, 1992); S.C. Res. 814
(Mar. 26, 1993).
9. See discussion in Christina Binder, Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950), MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006), http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL.
10. Nicaragua, supra note 6, ¶ 176.
11. Id., ¶ 199.
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fense) to stabilize the situation. And, in any event, those States have not
made an official request for collective defense assistance.
The only colorable self-defense argument is that the United States may
use force to preclude the possibility of chemical weapons falling into the
hands of transnational terrorist groups that might use them against either
the United States or its allies. Anticipatory self-defense is limited to situations in which an armed attack is “imminent.” The imminency criterion
had traditionally been understood as requiring temporal proximity between
the impending armed attack and the forceful defensive action taken to prevent it. This is no longer the case. In light of the risk inherent in attacks
involving weapons of mass destruction launched without warning,12 an interpretation of self-defense that has gained favor allows a State to use force
anticipatorily when facing an attacker who has the capability and intent to
mount an armed attack once failure to act would deprive that State of an
ability to defend itself.13 In other words, the potential victim State may take
forceful action if the “window of opportunity” to mount an effective defense is about to close.14
Applied to the Syrian situation, this threshold has not been crossed.
There is no evidence that Syria intends to transfer chemical weapons to
transnational terrorist groups targeting the United States or other countries.
Nor has the Assad regime lost control of the country to the point where it
is probable that the weapons will fall into the hands of terrorist groups.
Should the latter situation occur, military operations in Syria would be
permissible against the weapons and the terrorist groups in anticipatory
self-defense, but not against regime targets.
12. This risk was first highlighted in THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (Nov. 2002), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/.
13. See discussion in Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism under the
Jus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT:
EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 157 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007).
14. The last window of opportunity approach was first set forth in Michael N.
Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 524, 534–36 (2002–2003). The U.S. government has since adopted the
standard. See, e.g., Department of Justice White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation
Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an
Associated Force, Draft, 7 (Nov. 8, 2011), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc
/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf; Eric Holder, Attorney General, Remarks
at Northwestern University School of Law, (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov
/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.
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C. Violation of the Ban on Chemical Weapon.
The Administration has repeatedly suggested that it may act to ensure accountability for Syria’s unlawful use of chemical weapons. For instance,
Secretary of State Kerry has argued, “all peoples and all nations who believe in the cause of our common humanity must stand up to assure that
there is accountability for the use of chemical weapons so that it never
happens again.”15 The question is whether Syria’s chemical attacks have
normative significance—is the use of chemical weapons prohibited during
non-international armed conflicts, and, if so, does this justify the use force
by the United States?
Treaties promulgated as early as 1899 and 1925 banned the use of
chemical weapons for parties thereto.16 However, these earlier treaties did
not extend to non-international armed conflicts. The 1993 Convention on
Chemical Weapons prohibits chemical weapons use “under any circumstances,”17 but Syria is not party to that instrument. During negotiations
over the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the issue of
whether to address chemical weapons use proved extremely contentious.18
The final Statute, adopted in Rome in 1998, lists their use as a war crime
during international armed conflict alone.19
Despite these facts, any doubt as to the existence of a norm prohibiting
the use of chemical weapons in non-international armed conflict would be
misplaced. The adoption of an amendment at the 2010 Kampala Review
Conference filled the void in the ICC Statute by including (for States ratify15. John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Remarks on Syria (Aug. 26, 2013) http://www.state
.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213503.htm.
16. Hague Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles
Diffusing Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 998,
187 Consol. T.S. 453; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94
L.N.T.S. 65
17. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, art I.1, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S.
45.
18. Neither the United States nor Syria is Party to the Statute. However, the Statute is
generally considered a reliable restatement of those acts that constitute war crimes under
customary international law; hence, its reference in the instant context.
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xiii), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. On the Rome Statute and chemical weapons, see Dapo Akande, Can
the ICC Prosecute for Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria? EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 23, 2013),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-icc-prosecute-for-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/.
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ing it) the “[employment of] asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices” in the category of “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character.”20 Additionally, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia has held that use of chemical weapons is unlawful
during a non-international armed conflict.21 Most importantly, the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons has undeniably crystallized into a
norm of customary international law applicable in all armed conflicts. The
ICRC reached this conclusion in the Customary International Humanitarian
Law study; its characterization has not been seriously questioned.22 And, of
course, even in the absence of an express prohibition on the employment
of chemical weapons, their use against the civilian population would, as
with the use of any other weapon, amount to a war crime.23 “[W]hen committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,” it would also constitute a crime against humanity.24 The
Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons is indisputably a conspicuous and
egregious breach of international law.
International law, however, generally provides no mechanism by which
individual States may “punish” other States for violating international
norms, including the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. To some
extent, that is a good thing because it limits the opportunity for subterfuge
when claiming a right to use force and precludes destabilizing international
vigilantism. Instead, States may only respond to an unlawful act with unfriendly but lawful measures (retorsion),25 countermeasures not involving
the use of force when they are the victim of the violation,26 and self20. Amendment to Rome Statute, Art. 8(2)(e)(xiv), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG.pdf.
21. See Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion, supra note 3, ¶¶ 120–22, 124.
22. I INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, r.74 and accompanying commentary (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Customary IHL]. See also MICHAEL
N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE
LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY ¶ 2.2.2.c (2006);
Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion, supra note 3, ¶¶ 120–22, 124.
23. Rome Statute, supra note 19, arts. 8(2)(c)(i) & 8(2)(e).
24. Id., art. 7(1).
25. See discussion in Thomas Giegerich, Retorsion, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001), http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL.
26. International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83 annex, arts. 22, 49–54, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec.
12, 2001).
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defense when the violation of international law qualifies as an armed attack.
Beyond these circumstances, only the Security Council wields the power to
punish States for misconduct. By the terms of Article 39 of the Charter, the
Council may do so whenever necessary to “maintain or restore international peace and security.” In the Syrian case, robust remedies for the unlawful
use of chemical weapons are therefore limited to Security Council action
and to prosecution of those individuals who committed, or are otherwise
responsible for, the war crimes and crimes against humanity.27 A U.S. attack on Syria designed to hold that State accountable for its breach of international law would itself constitute an armed attack to which Syria (and
other States engaging in collective self-defense at Syria’s request) could respond forcefully.
D. Assistance to the Syrian Rebels
It is well accepted that during a non-international armed conflict, external
States may lawfully provide military assistance to the government, although
not to rebel forces.28 But might strikes against the Assad regime be justified
on the basis that the rebel forces have become the government of Syria?
This is precisely the situation that prevailed once the international community recognized Karzai’s government as the lawful Afghan government following the ouster of the Taliban.29
In November 2012, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary
and Opposition Forces (Syrian Opposition Council, SOC) was established.
A number of States soon recognized the entity as the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people.30 The same month, a State Department
spokesperson also labeled the SOC as the “legitimate representative of the
Syrian people,” a characterization repeated in December at the Friends of

27. In that Syria is not Party to the Rome Statute, prosecution before that court
would require referral by the Security Council. Rome Statute, supra note 19, ¶ 13(b). However, the offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction, thereby affording all States the right
under international law to prosecute the offenders.
28. Nicaragua, supra note 6, ¶ 246.
29. S.C. Res. 1419 (June 26, 2002).
30. Agreement on the Formation of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary
and Opposition Forces, Nov. 11, 2012. On recognition as the legitimate representative,
see, e.g., E.U. Council Conclusions on Syria, 16392/12, ¶ 2, Nov. 19, 2012,
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st16/st16392.en12.pdf.
751

International Law Studies

2013

the Syrian People meeting.31 However, in its 2012 Digest of U.S. Practice in
International Law, the State Department explained that despite these pronouncements “the United States does not recognize the SOC as the government of Syria.”32 Having taken this stance, the Administration has
closed the door to the possibility of styling military operations against Assad’s forces as lawful assistance to the new government of Syria. On the
contrary, and as recognized by the American Law Institute’s Restatement (3d)
of Foreign Relations, U.S. military support to a “rebellious regime . . . may violate Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter as a use or threat of force
against the political independence of the other state.”33
E. Humanitarian Intervention
In the attendant circumstances, the sole viable legal basis for attacking Syria
is humanitarian intervention.34 The death toll since the conflict began two
years ago now exceeds 100,000. Although the threshold at which the doctrine of humanitarian intervention applies is imprecise, it would seem apparent that once deaths begin to be measured in the hundreds of thousands, the line has been crossed. In this respect, the use of chemical weapons is a bit of a red herring since the number of deaths attributable to them
represents a fraction of the total. Therefore, at least in the humanitarian
intervention context, Syria’s possession of, and demonstrated willingness to
use, chemical weapons bears primarily on the issue of the likely extent of
future deaths.
A legal right of humanitarian intervention is not widely accepted. Instead, States generally tend to cite a “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).35 By
31. Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State Deputy Spokesperson David Toner
(Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/11/200477.htm#SYRIA;
Office of the Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 281 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2012), http://www.state.gov/docu
ments/organization/211955.pdf.
32. Id.
33. Restatement of the Law Third: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
203 (1987).
34. On the subject, see Dapo Akande, The Legality of Military Action in Syria: Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.
ejiltalk.org/humanitarian-intervention-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-legality-ofmilitary-action-in-syria/.
35. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Dec. 2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS
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R2P, States are said to bear the responsibility to protect their own nationals
from harm. When they fail to do so, other States have a commensurate responsibility to take necessary measures to protect those individuals. It must
be emphasized that R2P is a political mechanism and moral imperative, not
a legal obligation or right. In other words, the concept provides no independent legal basis for using force to intervene in another State; to the extent the responsibility involves the use of force, that force may only be authorized through the Security Council.36 R2P is an approach that the United States supports.37
By contrast, humanitarian intervention is a legal concept, albeit one that
does not appear in any treaty. If the doctrine exists at all, it does so only as
a matter of customary international law. States have been reticent to openly
embrace the doctrine for fear that other States will misuse it in order to
interfere in the affairs of their neighbors.
Despite such concerns, it can be fairly argued that the right has crystallized into customary law over the past decades. Key way points along the
path of this development include international condemnation for failure to
intervene in Rwanda,38 apparent acceptance of ECOWAS interventions in
Africa without Security Council authorization,39 the NATO intervention in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo, and criticism over the
failure of the international community to intervene in a meaningful way in
Darfur.40 Such an argument is, of course, tenuous in light of apparent op-

%20Report.pdf. See also Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 99.
36. Report of the Secretary General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive
Response, ¶¶ 138–39, UN Doc. A/66/874–S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012).
37. As set forth in the Outcome Document of the 2005 U.N. World Summit, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/60/1, at ¶¶ 138–40; DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE, supra note 31, at
570. See also United States Mission to the United Nations, Remarks by the United States at
an Informal Discussion on “Responsibility while Protecting”, Feb. 21, 2012, http://usun
.state.gov/briefing/statements/184487.htm.
38. See, e.g., Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations
during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Dec. 15, 1999, annexed to Letter Dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999).
39. U.N. Doc. S/22133 (Jan. 22, 1991); S.C. Res. 866 (Sept. 22, 1993); U.N. Doc.
S/6481 (Feb. 26, 1998); S.C. Res. 1260 (Aug. 20, 1999).
40. The U.N. Security Council approved deployment of a peace force (United Nations Mission in Darfur—UNAMID) in 2007, but only following the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement. S.C. Res. 1769 (July 31, 2007).
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position to the doctrine by key States such as Russia and China; but it is
not unreasonable.41
To date, the United States has not expressly acknowledged a right of
humanitarian intervention. Indeed, in the case of Syria, the Administration
appears to be talking around the issue. This approach stands in distinction
to that adopted by our closest ally. The United Kingdom’s government under Prime Minister David Cameron has officially embraced the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention as providing a legal ground for operations
against Syria.42 Its position can only be based on a legal conclusion that sufficient State practice and opinio juris has now accumulated for a customary
norm permitting humanitarian intervention to have fully matured.43
The U.K. has not only accepted the legal doctrine, but has articulated
three conditions precedent for taking action on that basis:
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale,
requiring immediate and urgent relief;
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to
the use of force if lives are to be saved; and
(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to
the aim of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time
and scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and
for no other purpose).44

It would be difficult to legally justify any humanitarian intervention not
meeting these criteria. Arguably, a fourth criterion also applies. There must
be some prospect of success, that is, the intervention must be likely to significantly alleviate the suffering to a degree not possible through non41. Only the United Kingdom and Belgium asserted the right of humanitarian intervention in the Legality of the Use of Force cases before the International Court of Justice over
the Kosovo intervention. Documents on the cases are available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3.
42. UK Prime Minister, Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government
Legal Position, Aug. 29, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemicalweapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-bysyrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version.
43. North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb.
20).
44. UK Government Legal Position, supra note 42.
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forceful measures. This is a particularly relevant point in the Syrian context
because President Obama has indicated that there will be no “boots on the
ground” and Congress is discussing time limitations on the operations. If
the conditions and restrictions ultimately imposed are so stringent that the
success of the operation is drawn into question, the operation cannot qualify as a lawful humanitarian intervention.
Fulfillment of these criteria in the Syria case is a question of fact about
which reasonable people may differ. However, the conclusion by Prime
Minister Cameron’s government that they have been met is judicious. The
United States could adopt a similar legal rationale for its pending strikes
against Syria.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Absent a significant change in circumstances, there is only one possible
legal basis upon which to justify military operations against Syria—
humanitarian intervention.45 Yet, the very existence of such a right in international law is highly controversial. Moreover, the United States has never
explicitly accepted the doctrine de jure, despite invoking it de facto as an exceptional measure during the 1999 Kosovo intervention.
This places the United States on the horns of a dilemma. On the one
hand, any avowed right of humanitarian intervention will represent key
opinio juris that will measurably strengthen arguments that a third legal
ground for using force exists in customary law. The United States should
be concerned that other States might then take advantage of the doctrine
for purposes that run contrary to its national interests. On the other hand,
as a nation committed to the rule of law, the United States should only engage in operations consistent with international law. When legal ambiguity
exists, as it does in this case, the Administration must transparently set
forth its interpretation of the law justifying the use of force against other
States.
In this regard, and although the U.K. Parliament rejected participation
in strikes against Syria, the British government must be commended for
45. For an excellent summary of the issues discussed in this article, see Kenneth Anderson, Legality of Intervention in Syria in Response to Chemical Weapon Attacks 17 ASIL INSIGHTS (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights130830.cfm. On the related subject
of the legality of providing arms to the Syrian rebels, see Legitimacy Versus Legality Redux:
Arming the Syrian Rebels, 7 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY __ (forthcoming 2013).
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taking a principled stance that its operations have to be consistent with international law, and then setting forth a reasoned interpretation of the law
upon which those operations could have been based. The United States
would be well served to follow suit before ordering its armed forces into
action.
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